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Abstract 
Information is a critical asset on which virtually all modern organizations depend 
upon to meet their operational mission objectives.  Military organizations, in particular, 
have embedded Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) into their core 
mission processes as a means to increase their operational efficiency, exploit automation, 
improve decision quality, and shorten the kill chain.  However, the extreme dependence 
upon ICT results in an environment where a cyber incident can result in severe mission 
degradation, or possibly failure, with catastrophic consequences to life, limb, and 
property.  These consequences can be minimized by maintaining real-time situational 
awareness of mission critical resources so appropriate contingency actions can be taken 
in a timely manner following an incident in order to assure mission success. 
In this thesis, the design and analysis of an experiment is presented for the 
purpose of measuring the utility of a Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment 
(CIMIA) notification process, whose goal is to improve the timeliness and relevance of 
incident notification.  In the experiment, subjects are placed into a model environment 
where they conduct operational tasks in the presence and absence of enhanced CIMIA 
notifications.  The results of the experiment reveal that implementing a CIMIA 
notification process significantly reduced the response time required for subjects to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions to assure their organizational mission.  
The research confirms that timely and relevant notification following a cyber incident is 
an essential element of mission assurance. 
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MEASURING THE UTILITY OF A CYBER INCIDENT MISSION IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT (CIMIA) PROCESS FOR MISSION ASSURANCE 
I. Introduction 
Information is a critical asset, on which organizations depend to meet mission 
objectives.  Military organizations, in particular, have embedded Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) into their core mission processes as a means to 
increase their operational efficiency, exploit automation, improve decision quality, and 
shorten the kill chain (Grimaila et al., 2009a).  However, the increasing dependence upon 
ICT has resulted in an environment where an incident involving a cyber resource, 
hereafter called a “cyber incident,” can result in severe mission degradation or failure 
with catastrophic consequences to life, limb, and property (Grimaila et al., 2010).  Even 
organizations that build and maintain robust security capabilities will enviably experience 
a cyber incident resulting from external attacks, insider attackers, natural disasters, 
human errors, infrastructure degradation, or equipment failure (Grimaila et al., 2007).  
When a cyber incident occurs, it is essential to notify all decision makers whose missions 
are potentially affected in a timely and relevant manner in order to assure mission 
success. 
1.1 Background 
In a military context, information is continuously being collected, processed and 
analyzed, aggregated, stored, and distributed for multiple purposes, including support of 
situational awareness, operations planning, and command decision making (Grimaila et 
al., 2008a).  Military organizations exhibit unique attributes such as high levels of 
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sustained information interaction among multiple entities, distributed time sensitive 
decision making, and the criticality of consequences that may result from ill-informed 
decision making.  In some cases, operations have critical time interdependencies which 
require significant planning and coordination to ensure the success of the mission 
objectives.  The timeliness of the information used in the decision making process 
dramatically impacts the quality of command decisions.  Hence, the documentation of 
information dependencies is essential for the organization to gain a full appreciation of its 
operational risks (Grimaila et al., 2009b; Grimaila et al., 2010).  Information 
dependencies encompass not only the information itself, but also all of the ICT systems 
and devices used to store, process, transmit, or disseminate the information.  Further, one 
must understand how the information supports the organizational objectives and how the 
information value changes as a function of time in relation to other mission activities.  
While eliciting and documenting this information is not a trivial task, it is an essential 
prerequisite for mission assurance so that mission risk management can be performed 
(e.g., architect missions to be more resilient to cyber attacks prior to mission execution 
and inform contingency decision making when the mission is underway) (Grimaila et al., 
2010).  
Unfortunately, military organizations today struggle to maintain awareness of the 
ICT systems they depend on for day-to-day operations.  Several underlying problems 
have been identified: 1) lack of dynamic risk assessment process, 2) lack of 
documentation that explicitly identifies information assets and their mission value, 3) 
lack of timely and relevant notification of downstream information consumers following 
an information incident, and 4) poor to non-existent knowledge continuity (Grimaila et 
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al., 2009b).   Most military organizations do not collect, document, maintain, refine, 
disseminate, and exploit knowledge of mission-to-information dependencies effectively.   
However, the ability to efficiently identify, quantify, document, and maintain a formal 
understanding of mission-to-information resource risk is of paramount importance to 
provide decision makers with actionable information needed to evaluate their mission 
risk as a function of their ICT dependency.  This insight is needed to proactively design 
robust missions, develop and maintain situational awareness following an incident, take 
appropriate contingency measures to assure mission success, and to retain and exploit the 
“lessons learned” gained from experience (Grimaila et al., 2010; Hale et al., 2010). 
1.2 Problem Statement and Purpose of Research  
This research seeks to measure the utility of timely and relevant notification 
following a cyber incident in a model operational setting.  The underlying premise of the 
research is that timely and relevant notification will enable appropriate contingency 
actions to be taken sooner, improving operational outcomes and mission assurance. This 
research is part of the Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment (CIMIA) project 
sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory which is focused upon improving the 
timeliness and relevance of cyber incident notifications within the USAF through the 
development of an incident notification Decision Support System (DSS).  The objectives 
of the research will be attained through human subject experimentation conducted in a 
model hypothetical operational Air Force unit.  This research seeks to objectively 
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of cyber incident notifications both in the “as is” 
case and in the presence of a proposed CIMIA incident notification process.  In doing so, 
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the focus is upon understanding how information dependency knowledge can be used 
following a cyber incident to improve incident response and decision making to assure 
mission operations.    
1.3 Hypothesis  
The primary goal of the CIMIA project is to provide timely, accurate, secure, and 
relevant notification from the instant an information incident is declared, until the cyber 
incident is fully remediated (Grimaila et al., 2009a).  There has been no quantitative 
research that has been conducted to measure the effect of timely and relevant notification 
for cyber incident response on mission objectives.  The purpose of this experiment is to 
remedy this deficiency by designing an experiment in a realistic mission environment that 
will provide the empirical evidence necessary to test the main hypothesis.  The main 
hypothesis for this research was developed based on the notion that it is important to 
promptly notify decision makers within an organization about cyber incidents in a timely 
manner so they can take appropriate contingency measures and assure their mission.  The 
null and alternate hypotheses are as follows: 
Ho: There is no statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident 
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents. 
Ha: There is a statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident 
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents. 
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If there is a statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident 
notification processes, it is expected that the proposed CIMIA incident notification 
process will result in a reduction in the length of time required for mission personnel to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents improving 
mission assurance. 
1.4 Research Goals 
 The primary goal of this research is to determine how the proposed CIMIA DSS 
would impact mission objectives by evaluating its impact upon the time required to 
identify a cyber incident and take appropriate contingency measures to assure the 
organizational mission.  This research goal complements other CIMIA research elements 
focused upon identifying ideal candidate DSS technologies conducive for incident 
notification (Woskov, 2011) and developing an incident notification architecture that 
links together mission dependent entities (Miller, 2011).  Lastly, this research seeks to 
demonstrate the importance of explicit documentation identifying information resources 
and their mission value.  One result of this research would be to replace the manual effort 
required to coordinate with the affected system owners and custodians to determine 
which organizations are potentially affected by the incident.  As a result, this research 
effort can be operationalized by infusing a reliable DSS into the workplace, where 
deemed appropriate.  By doing so, organizations could potentially benefit from real-time 
notification following an information incident.   In addition to improved decision making, 
the DSS may also provide knowledge continuity for mission owners.   
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
This research is organized into five chapters with the first chapter providing the 
introduction.  Chapter 2 is a literature review of pertinent background information related 
to this research.  It then discusses the proposed CIMIA incident notification process, the 
USAF incident notification process, and some key concepts that support the CIMIA 
methodology.  Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the experiment of the study that is used 
to determine that the value of the proposed CIMIA incident notification process within 
military environments.  Chapter 5 provides the conclusion of the research and offers areas 
for future study in the research domain.   
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II. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter acquaints the reader with several key concepts and issues pertaining 
to the research.  First, definitions and perspectives on situation awareness, decision 
making and human performance are reviewed.  Next, the current Air Force (AF) cyber 
incident notification process and proposed alternative incident notification process, 
CIMIA, are discussed.  Finally, this chapter concludes by discussing the key concepts 
that support the proposed CIMIA methodology.  
2.2 Situation Awareness 
 The concept of Situational Awareness (SA) has its roots in the fields of air traffic 
control, airplane cockpit control, military commands and control, and information 
warfare.  SA can be traced back to World War I, where it was recognized as a crucial 
component for crews in military aircraft (Endsley 1996; Endsley & Jones, 1997, 2001; 
Endsley & Garland 2000).  Today, SA is one of the most prominent research topics in the 
aviation Human Factors field; this interest grew in the mid-1980s and increased through 
the 1990s partially through advancements in technology (Endsley & Garland, 2000).  SA 
can be achieved by people alone, while the human factors approach often requires the 
integration of a specific technology, like automation.  Although technology can be useful 
to detect and report incident indictors or intuitions, Endsley argues that people are 
frequently slow in detecting that a problem has occurred which necessitates human 
intervention (1996).  The author identified that additional time is spent figuring out the 
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situation and course of action, ultimately delaying human performance that can result in 
slight delays to catastrophic failures with major consequences (Endsley, 1996).    
While several limitations have been identified and discussed regarding problems 
with automation and automation failures, (Ephrath & Young, 1981; Kessel & Wickens, 
1982; Wickens & Kessel, 1979; Young, 1969; Endsley 1996) Endsley (1996) points out 
that the use of automation can also be beneficial to achieving a higher level of SA with 
several new approaches to automation.   One daunting challenge is to keep the “human in 
the loop” (Endsley, 1995).  Endsley suggests one approach would be “to optimize the 
assignment of control between the human and the automated system by keeping both 
involved in the system operation” (1996).   Furthermore, to reduce negative impact on the 
operator’s SA (lower levels), a level of automation should be determined while keeping 
the human actively involved in the decision making loop (Endsley, 1996).  
According to Endsley, decision makers’ SA is a major factor driving the quality 
of the decision process (1997).  In other words, SA influences the decision making 
process; it is “represented as the main precursor to decision making” (Endsley & Garland, 
2000, p. 8).  Although SA may mean many things to many people, simply put, SA is 
being aware of what is going on in one’s surroundings, in the context of the individuals’ 
objectives.   Endsley’s definition is widely recognized and defined as “the perception of 
the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension 
of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988, 
p.97).  The “elements” of SA “vary widely between domains, the nature of SA and the 
mechanism used for achieving SA can be described generically” (Endsley, 2000, p.5).  
SA is described as being dynamic, hard to maintain, and easy to lose.  Although SA is a 
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challenging to maintain, it is central to good decision making and performance (Endsley, 
2000).  In cyberspace, decision makers face the challenge of maintaining a high level of 
situational awareness to function in a timely and effective manner following a cyber 
incident.  SA in cyberspace is crucial to mission success to allow decision makers to 
understand what matters.  They must be able to continuously depend on critical ICT and 
avoid working with tampered, corrupt, or missing information.  Therefore, SA in 
cyberspace must be maintained in order to ensure information dominance in cyberspace.     
2.3 Maintaining Situation Awareness  
A number of factors have been shown to influence the process of acquiring and 
maintaining SA.  Endsley describes three processes: perception, comprehension, and 
projection (Endsley, 1995): 
• Level 1 SA - Perception of the elements in the environment  
• Level 2 SA – Comprehension of the current situation 
• Level 3 SA – Projections of future status 
SA provides “primary basis of for subsequent decision making and performance in the 
operation of complex, dynamic systems.”  At the lowest level, perception is considered 
fundamental to the process to reduce the odds of developing a model of a given situation; 
“it involves perceiving critical factors in the environment” (Endsley, 1988, 1995).  At 
level 2 SA, a mental model is developed which are observations that correspond with 
knowledge and experience: “understanding what those factors means, particularly when 
integrated together in relation to the person’s goals (Endsley, 1988, 1995).  In level 3 SA, 
understanding from the previous level enables projections of a future state of the 
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environment: “an understanding of what will happen with the system in the near future” 
(Endsley, 1988, 1995).  Endsley (1998) reported that “these higher levels of SA are 
critical for allowing a decision maker to function in a timely and effective manner” (p. 2). 
SA is strongly related to the decision making process (Endsley, 2000).  The 
theoretical model of SA shows the relationship between SA and decision making (Figure 
1).  Endsley says that SA must precede decision making because the operator has to 
perceive a situation in order to have a goal.  Adams et al (1995) suggest an inter-
relationship between SA and the processes used to achieve that knowledge.  Smith and 
Hancock (1994) argue, but emphasize that “SA is up-to-the minute comprehension of the 
task relevant information that enables appropriate decision making stress” (p. 3).     
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Situation Awareness (adapted from Endsley & Garland, 
2000) 
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2.4 Cyber Attacks and Situational Awareness 
 A cyber attack that compromises the protection of information can have 
catastrophic affects to mission objectives if the attack goes undetected, or the attack is 
interpreted as business as usual (e.g. software glitches, computer crashes, ordinary 
maintenance, frequent unavailability, etc.) which seems normal (Endsley & Jones, 2001).  
Endsley (2001) proposed a model that “incorporates the ways in which information 
attacks can effectively disrupt human decision making at various points in 
information processing” (p.6) (Figure 2).  By carefully examining not only the cues 
that might depict an attack to information systems, but also how human observers 
will be affected by such cues, one can develop more robust systems for protecting 
against disruptions and information attack (Endsley & Jones, 2001).  The model helps to 
explain the effects that disruptions can have on SA and decision making in four major 
categories: 1) disruptions that affect information pre-processing; 2) disruptions that 
affect prioritization and attention; (3) disruptions that affect confidence in information, 
and (4) disruptions that affect interpretation (Endsley & Jones, 2001).  Although 
disruptions can range from information overload to cyber attacks or malicious activity, 
“the intention of the model is to help direct efforts at creating systems for supporting 
decision makers in effectively comprehending and dealing with information attacks 
and normal disruptions” (Endsley & Jones, 2001).  Further, the author explains that the 
model “is being used to develop decision support tools for detecting such attacks within 
the context of normal disruptions and interruptions” (Endsley & Jones, 2001).      
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Figure 2. Decision Content for Detecting and Diagnosing Information Attacks (adapted 
from Endsley, 2001) 
2.5 Human performance and automation 
Automation shifts human performance from a physical workload to a more 
cognitive and perceptual activity which raises a host of human factor issues dealing with 
situation awareness, vigilance, stress and workload (Endsley, 1996; Parasuraman, 1987; 
Wickens & Carswell, 1997).  There are several cases in which operators do not detect 
critical state changes when acting as monitors of automated systems for a number of 
reasons (Ephrath & Young; 1981; Kessel & Wickens, 1982; Wickens & Kessel, 1979; 
Young 1969).  Monitoring failures have occurred irregardless of the complexility level of 
the tasks.  According to Wickens and Carswell (1997), information processing lies at the 
heart of human performance.  As humans interact with systems, “the operator must 
perceive information, transform that information into different  forms, and take actions on 
the basis of the percievd and transformed information” (p.90).   Information processing 
occurs in stages from perceptions in the environment to acting upon that envirnoment.  
Environment/System 
Situation Awareness 
Perception Comprehension Projection 
Decision 
 Making Action 
• How urgent is the problem? 
• Is this a new problem or part 
of an already diagnosed 
problem? 
• Do I need to take an action? 
• Do I need to gather more 
information? 
 
 
• What is causing this event? 
• Is this a “normal situation”? 
• Is this a singular problem or is it 
connected to other events 
• What impact will this have on 
my facility and mission? 
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Wickens’ model (1992) in Figure 3 depicts the stages that develop in an operators 
perception of the environment based on sensory processing to attend to, select, organize, 
and interupt information in order to meaningfully recognize objects and events in the 
environment.  Wickens’ explains operators selectively focus on and attend to specific 
stimuli that are most relevant to their goals or purpose (1992; Wickens and Carswell, 
1997).  Attendion initaties information processing and short-term/working memory.  
Information which is attended to enters either short-term or working memory where 
thinking occurs from external stimuli.  Internal thought processes generate reason, 
problem solve or make decisions to initate responses and actions.   Decision making 
requires the decision maker to make a choice between several alternatives. 
 
Figure 3. A model of human information processing (adapted from Wickens, 1992) 
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2.6 Human Decision Making  
Decision making is a subset to the information processing that draws upon 
sensory inputs.  A paper by Lehto, “Decision making,” discusses that as decisions grow 
more complex, information processing actually becomes part of decision making and 
methods of decision support that help decision makers process information become of 
growing importance (1997).  Therefore, if automation is used to aid higher levels of SA 
for decision makers to avoid undesirable consequences, the effects of automation support 
must be carefully considered relative to information processing. The CIMIA incident 
notification process is an alternative methodology to the incident notification process 
utilized within the USAF to assist decision makers’ to maintain awareness of critical ICT 
following a cyber incident.   
2.7 CIMIA Incident Notification Process 
The CIMIA project has proposed a different approach to deal with incident 
notification following cyber incidents (Grimaila et al., 2009a).  CIMIA proposes a 
conceptual methodology for a defensive cyber damage and mission impact assessment to 
provide decision makers situational awareness of the impact to mission capability 
following a successful cyber incident; impact is a function of CIA (Fortson, 2007; 
Fortson et al., 2007; Grimaila et al., 2007; Grimaila et al., 2008a; Grimaila et al., 2008b; 
Grimaila et al., 2009a; Grimaila et al., 2009b; Grimaila et al., 2010; Hale et al., 2010).  
Instead of a technology-based focus, an information asset-based focus is more conducive 
to document mission-to-information dependencies.   Organizations must employ a robust 
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risk management strategy that accounts for the mission, the information that is required 
for mission success, and the ICT used in mission fulfillment in order to support risk 
tradeoffs and contingency decision making.  The use of a risk management process 
allows decision makers to explicitly identify and document critical ICT systems 
(Grimaila et al., 2009a; NIST, 2002; NIST, 2010; AFI-33-138, 2010).  This is extremely 
important when decision makers need an accurate assessment of how a cyber incident 
impacts their mission.  
By accomplishing a risk assessment, decision makers would achieve pre-incident 
activities identified in the CIMIA incident notification process (Figure 4). These pre-
incident activities deliberately identify and document all critical information processes 
and assets that affect mission accomplishment for the organization.   As Fortson (2007) 
noted, this research advocates an asset-focused approach that takes into account the 
information assets impact to the mission long before an incident occurs.  According to 
Grimaila et al. (2008b): 
The identification and valuation of information dependencies must occur 
before an incident occurs. Identification of an information dependency 
inherently implies there is a supplier (source) of the information and a 
consumer (sink) of the information. In some cases, both the information 
supplier and consumer may be within the same organization, in others they 
may be in different organizations. Regardless, each organization must first 
identify, document, and value its information dependencies. This can be 
accomplished through an information asset-focused risk assessment or 
using other similar information asset profiling techniques.  (NIST 2002; 
Alberts and Dorofee, 2003, 2005). 
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Figure 4. Defensive Cyber Damage and Mission Impact Assessment Time (Fortson, 
2007) 
While the USAF notification process focuses on pushing cyber incident 
notifications to all organizations in the Air Force Network Operations hierarchy, the 
CIMIA incident notification process is focused on enabling downstream consumers to 
discover and directly subscribe to the status of the mission critical ICT systems they 
depend on to attain their mission objectives.  In the proposed CIMIA incident notification 
process, when an information incident occurs, the downstream consumers are notified in 
near real-time that an event has occurred that may impact their missions as a consequence 
of the loss, or potential loss of, information security (Grimaila et al., 2009a).  The 
notification will “supply meaningful mission impact assessment and enable accurate 
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predictive situational awareness, and develop a timely understanding of possible 
adversarial intent during a cyber incident” (Grimaila et al., 2008b, p.9).  Unfortunately, 
the existing USAF cyber incident notification process does not provide the ability to 
uniquely identify and notify decision makers who are critically dependent on the affected 
ICT systems.  Table 1 presents a comparison chart of the two incident notification 
processes.   
Table 1. Incident Notification Process Comparison Chart 
Incident Notification 
Process NOTAM (USAF) Pop-up (CIMIA) 
Methodology 
Pushes incident notifications 
to all organizations in the 
Air Force Network 
Hierarchy  
Enables downstream 
consumers to discover and 
directly subscribe to the status 
of mission critical ICT 
systems 
Timeliness 
Disseminates to subordinate 
organizations within 24 
hours  
Disseminates to downstream 
consumers in near real-time 
that an event occurred 
Relevance 
Incident notification is 
informative in nature; 
primarily limited to 
technical metrics  
Provides meaningful mission 
impact and potential mission 
impact to decision makers 
following cyber incident  
Process 
Focus upon the protection of 
systems and network 
infrastructure elements 
Focus upon information 
stored, processed, and 
transmitted within the 
infrastructure  
Means of communications   
C4 NOTAM disseminates 
via email 
Cyber incident notification 
disseminates via a mockup 
pop-up 
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2.8 Current Cyber Incident Notification Process 
When a cyber incident occurs, it is essential to notify decision makers whose 
missions are affected in a timely and relevant manner to assure mission success.  AFI 33-
138 explains the process used by Air Force Network Operations to generate, disseminate, 
acknowledge, implement, track, and report network compliance end status information.  
This document details the use of Time Compliance Network Orders for communicating 
downward-directed operations, security and configuration management-related orders 
issued by the Air Force Network Operations Security Center.  Notification following a 
cyber incident occurs using a Command, Control, Communications, and Computers 
Notice to Airmen (C4 NOTAMs).  C4 NOTAMs are informative in nature and are the 
primary means for notifying organizations that a network incident has occurred which 
may impact their mission operations.  C4 NOTAMs are disseminated via email to 
organizations required to be notified in accordance with AFI 33-138.  The C4 NOTAM, 
in Figure 5, is broadcast to all organizations identified as potentially affected by the 
incident.  As a consequence, some organizations may be notified who are not dependent 
upon the affected ICT systems (Grimaila et al., 2009b).  Worse, some organizations may 
not be identified as dependent on the affected resource even though they are directly or 
indirectly critically dependent upon the affected ICT systems.   Thi1s situation prevents a 
decision maker from acquiring a meaningful level of SA on the status of critical ICT. 
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Figure 5. C4 NOTAM 
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT DATE: 13 JAN 2011 
INTITAL RELEASE TIME:  13 0455Z JAN  11 
TCNO TRACKING NUMBER:  NOTAM C4-N AFNOC 2010-100-001  
ORIGINATING AGENCY:  663 OC/CYCC 
TYPE:  INFORMATIVE 
CATEGORY:  NOTAM 
PRIORITY:  SERIOUS 
SUBJECT:  VULNERABILITY IN INTERNET EXPLORER COULD ALLOW REMOTE 
CODE EXECUTION (981374)  
MISSION IMPACT:  LOSS OF SYSTEM AVAILABILITY/INTEGRITY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: 
VULNERABILITY EXISTS IN MICROSOFT INTERNET EXPLORER THAT COULD 
ALLOW A REMOTE ATTACKER TO RUN CODE OF THE ATTACKER’S CHOICE 
OR PERFORM A DEINAL-OF-SERVICE (DOS) AGAINST A VULNERABLE 
SYSTEM.  MS INTERNET EXPLORER IS A WEB BROWSER FOR MICROSOFT 
SYSTEMS.    
SYSTEM(S) AFFECTED: 
WINDOWS XP SP 2 AND WINDOWS XP SP 3 
WINDOWS XP PROFESSIONAL X64 EDITION SP 2 
WINDOWS SERVER 2003 SP 2 
WINDOWS SERVER X64 EDITION SP 2 
INTERNET EXPLORER 6 SP 1 FOR WINDOWS XP SP 2 
INTERNET EXPLORER 7 FOR WINDOWS XP SP 2 
INTERNET EXPLORER 7 IN WINDOWS VISTA, WINDOWS VISTA SP 1, WINDOWS 
VISTA SP 1 
ACTION: 
PATCHES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME.  ORGANIZATIONS MAY APPLY 
THE MS ADVISORY WORK AROUNDS TO TEMPORARILY ALLEVIATE THIS 
PROBLEM.  A TCNO WILL BE RELEASED ONCE MS ISSUES PATCHES FOR THIS 
VULNERABILITY.   
NOTE:  ALL WORK AROUNDS WILL IMPACT OPERATIONS IN SOME WAY.  
PLEASE READ THE WORK AROUNDS CAREFULLY. 
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH UNPATACHED SYSTEMS:  UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS 
TO COMPROMISED SYSTEMS. 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: 
NONE 
REMARKS: 
PLEASE CONTACT 663 CS HELP DESK - IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS AND/OR 
CONCERNS AT 6503 
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Instead of utilizing email, the proposed CIMIA incident notification process is 
disseminated via a pop-up to downstream consumers who subscribe and pull the status of 
the critical ICT they depend on.   Pop-ups are known to visually capture that attention of 
an operator while using a computer.  They are a form of an interruption that captures the 
attention of an operator.  Some research suggests that interruptions (e.g. warnings, alerts, 
reminders, notifications, etc.) (Bailey et al., 2000) slows an operators’ performance on 
interrupted tasks; however, some evidence exist that an interruption may actually speed 
up the completion of a task (Zijlstra et al., 1999).  Hence operators are affected by 
interruptions in different ways.  For this reason, it is important to identify key features 
that may impact the effectiveness of the interruption.   Fischoff et al. (1998) paper, “What 
Information Belongs in a Warning?” suggests design of messages should focus on the 
“critical gaps between what consumers know and what they need to know” (p. 664).  
Because interruptions are typically viewed as communications whose purpose is to 
inform and influence behavior, the mockup of the pop-up was based on Laughery and 
Wogalter’s (1997) eight criteria for design and assessment of warnings.  They are: 
 1) Attention – should be designed to attract attention;  
2) Hazard information – should contain information about the nature of the hazard 
3) Consequence information –should contain information about the potential 
outcomes 
4) Instructions – should instruct about appropriate and inappropriate behavior  
5) Comprehension – should be understood by the target audience  
6) Motivation – should motivate people to comply 
7) Brevity – should be brief as possible 
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8) Durability – should last and be available as long as needed (p. 1195) 
In addition to this criterion, the challenge was to make the pop-up salient, attract the 
operator’s attention, and to make the information seem relevant.  Therefore, special 
consideration was given to the size, color, signal words, and content of the pop-up shown 
in Figure 6.  The reminder of this Chapter discusses some of the key concepts that 
support the CIMIA methodology. 
 
Figure 6. CIMIA incident notification 
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2.9 Information Security 
The widespread use of information and communications technology (ICT) has 
revolutionized the communication process and with it the significance and implications 
of information security.   Today, information has become more crucial than ever for 
decision makers to maintain mission awareness.   Decision makers depend on 
information to meet their mission objectives; they make decisions based on the 
information available at the time.  Mission objectives cannot be achieved with erroneous 
information.   Clearly, information must be protected, but knowing what information to 
protect is a challenge.  Although information is a basis for decision making, all 
information cannot be deemed critical.   Because critical information is valuable, 
organizations must recognize information security as a top priority and carefully consider 
protecting critical information that supports mission objectives.   
The Air Force uses security measures to protect and defend information and 
information systems through both OPSEC and information assurance (Department of the 
Air Force, 2002).   Joint Publication (JP) 3-54, Operations Security, 1997, defines 
OPSEC as a “process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing 
friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a) indentify those 
actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b) determine what 
indicators hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced 
together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c) select 
and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of 
friendly actions to adversary exploitation” (1997, p.26).  It explains that planning and 
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execution occur as part of the commander’s command and control warfare efforts in 
focusing on identifying and protecting critical information to increase mission 
effectiveness (DoD, 1997).   Information assurance, on the other hand, is defined as 
“those measures to protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring 
their availability, integrity, authenticity, confidentiality, and non-repudiation” 
(Department of the Air Force, 1998, p.17).   This definition is closely related to the 
definition of information security, which is an event that appears to be a breach of the 
organization’s information security countermeasures (i.e. systems that can prevent or 
mitigate the effects of, threats to a computer, server, or network).   In International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO)/ International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
Information Security Management  27000, information security is defined as the 
“preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information” (2009, p.3).  
Information security is the process of protecting information.  It is the protection of 
information and ICT against unauthorized access or modification on information.  “The 
adverse impact of a security event can be described in terms of loss or degradation of any 
or a combination of any, of the following three security goals: availability, integrity, and 
confidentiality” (NIST, 2002, p.22).   These three security goals, Confidentiality, 
Integrity, and Availability (CIA) are considered the core principles of information 
security, and are commonly referred to as the CIA triad.  The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), Special Publication 800-37 rev 1, Appendix B 
Glossary, defines CIA as:   
• Confidentiality – Preserving authorized restrictions on 
information access and disclosure to prevent disclosure to 
unauthorized individuals, entities or processes, including 
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means of protecting personal privacy and propriety 
information  
  
• Integrity – Guarding against improper information 
modification or destruction and includes ensuring 
information non-repudiation and authenticity 
 
• Availability – Ensuring timely and reliable access to and 
use of information (2009) 
 
Information can reasonably be called secure when confidentially, integrity, and 
availability of information are present.  Mutually, information security and information 
assurance share the common goal of protecting the CIA of information.  However, 
“information assurance process is applied through technology-based activities” 
(Department of the Air Force, 1998, p.17) while information security should be asset-
based focused.     
2.10 Information Asset 
The CIA of information is critical to organizations’ missions.  Therefore, 
organizations cannot form protection strategies that are focused solely on infrastructure.  
Instead, an information asset-based focus is more conductive to protecting critical 
information that supports the mission.   “Information should be the central focus in 
understanding mission impact because it holds relevance and value as knowledge to 
decision makers in the organization” (Grimaila et al., 2009a).   An information asset is 
“knowledge or data that has value to the organization” (ISO/IEC, 2009, p.3) or “any 
information that has enterprise value and is created, managed, or accessed during the 
operation of the organization” (AFPD 33-3, 2010, p.9).   Having an information asset-
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based focus allows organization to control risk with respect to protecting its information 
assets.  Achieving comprehensiveness in identification of assets is important because 
perpetrators often look for assets and vulnerabilities that defenders have not recognized 
(Parker, 2008).  Hence, vulnerabilities in one area can have significant impact to related 
mission interdependencies. 
2.11 Criticality of Information 
The value of any information is determined by the person using the information; it 
does not necessary have to be the decision maker.   AFI 31-401, Air Force Information 
Security Program, advocates for protection of Air Force information by “delegating 
authority to the lowest level possible” and “focusing on identifying and protecting only 
that information that requires protection” (2005, p.7).  Delegating authority down to the 
lowest level places the responsibility of protecting information on the information 
owners.  According to the Committee for National Security Systems (CNSS) Instruction 
4009, National Information Assurance Glossary, 2006, an information owner is an 
“official with statutory or operational authority for specified information and 
responsibility for establishing the controls for its generation, collection, processing, 
dissemination, and disposal.”  Along with many others, information owners must be 
involved in this process to specify the criticality of information to ensure the appropriate 
information security countermeasures (Pipken, 2008).  The type and amount of protection 
required depends on the nature of the information and its usage.  As appropriate, the 
protection of information varies between organizations; therefore, information owners 
should determine what protection their information requires based on criticality.  It is  
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important for owners of information to inform those who access, use, and depend on their 
information to understand the level of protection required, to implement appropriate 
security countermeasures, and to recognize information incidents when they occur, in 
order to take action.  In addition, the determination of criticality is not solely based on the 
information owner; instead, information consumers also must determine the criticality for 
the ICTs on which they depend on.   
According to AFI 33-129, Web Management and Internet Use, 2010, critical 
information is “sensitive mission data that by itself is unclassified, but when combined 
with other available data, may reveal classified information.”   Information alone may not 
seem important, but every little bit of information is a puzzle piece.   In order to protect 
mission-to-information dependencies, organizations must use a risk-based approach to 
determine the consequences of having inadequate protection before an information 
incident occurs.  All ICT must include security controls that reflect the value of critical 
information processed on the system.   The DoD and the Air Forces have done a 
commendable job in establishing directives, policies, procedures, and guidance for 
protecting information.  However, despite these efforts, ICT are far from being secure.  
Protecting against an information incident even on a small scale is challenge for 
organizations to accomplish.    
Organization cannot reply on a small set of protective technologies to protect 
critical ICT that support mission objectives.   ICT are constantly at risk of cyber attacks 
that compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  An adversary would like 
nothing more than to gain access to critical ICT on which decision makers depend to 
maintain mission success.  Therefore, organizations must employ a robust risk 
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management strategy that accounts for the mission, the information that is required for 
mission success, and the ICT used in mission fulfillment in order to support risk tradeoffs 
and contingency decision making.    
The scope of the problem with protecting critical information is identifying what 
information to protect.  Therefore, organizations must look at the information that 
directly supports mission objectives to apply adequate protection countermeasures.  This 
can be achieved by using a systematic approach, including risk management principles, to 
identify critical information and associated risks.  Otherwise, the lack of awareness could 
lead to information incidents that could compromise the mission.   Although insufficient 
resources exist to fully secure ICT, organizations can take steps to mitigate risks and 
improve their current state.   
2.12 Risk Management 
No organization is immune to risk; in fact, risks are constantly changing, which 
requires organizations to have a proper balance of control to achieve risk management.  
An organization implements a risk management program to reduce negative impact on its 
ability to perform the mission (NIST, 2010).   The goal of the risk management process is 
to help organizations manage their risks to an acceptable level.  It is recognized as a tool 
that organizations can use to protect invaluable critical information and better manage 
ICT and their risks.  “Risk management is the process that allows IT managers to balance 
operational and economic cost of protective measure and achieve gains in mission 
capability by protecting IT systems and data that support their organizations’ missions” 
(NIST, 2002, p.4).   Decision makers must make a commitment to understand and include 
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risk management in their decision making process to determine the extent of potential 
threats and risks associated with IT systems (NIST, 2002).  While this process is complex 
and constantly changing, it must be an organization wide effort.   The rapid growth in 
technology and information sharing has increased the risk to critical information being 
compromised.   Obviously, if decision makers decide not to execute risk management 
principles because the cost outweighs the gain, they are exposing the organization to risk.  
Organizations use risk management to identify what risks the organization is exposed to 
then decide which risks need immediate attention and which risks are acceptable.   
There are several different definitions of risk.  According to ISO/IEC 27000, risk 
is the “combination of the probability of an event and its consequence” (p.4).  NIST 800-
30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, 2002, describes risk as 
the net “negative impact of the exercise of a vulnerability, considering both the 
probability and the impact of the occurrence” (p.1).  Finally, risk is the likelihood that 
something bad will happen that causes harm to an informational asset (or the loss of the 
asset) (NIST, 2002).  While there are many different meanings of risk, risk-related events 
either have a positive or negative deviation from what is expected.  Although 
organizations should assess risk to determine the extent of potential threats and risks 
associated with ICT, the process can be extremely labor intensive, time consuming, and 
require periodic updates when mission objectives change.   
2.13 Risk Assessment 
While risk management processes are challenging, they are crucially important to 
identify risks and determine optimal protection strategies.  The implementation of risk 
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management in every organization is different.  Organizations must develop strategies 
that can be translated and tailored to their organizational mission.  The risk assessment 
process selected must provide an accurate assessment of the mission risk.    According to 
DoDD 3020.40, DoD Policy an Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure, 2010, risk 
assessment is a “system examination of risk using discipline processes, methods, and 
tools.”   From this perspective, it is the necessary actions taken to prevent, remediate, or 
mitigate the risks resulting from vulnerabilities.  Conducting the assessment provides an 
environment for decision makers to evaluate and prioritize risk continuously and to 
recommend strategies to remediate or mitigate those risks (DoD, 2010).   NIST 800-30 
describes risk assessment as the first process in the management methodology.  It is a 
process that identifies risk, assesses risk and takes steps to reduce risk; it encompasses 
identification and evaluation of risk and risk impacts, and recommendation of risk-
reducing measures.  Using this approach produces a value for IT assets and resources 
effect based on the potential mission impact (e.g. the criticality, and sensitivity of the IT 
system components and data) (NIST, 2002).  ISO 31000 recognizes that organizations 
operate in an uncertain environment.  Every decision made by a decision maker involves 
some level of risk.  It defines risk assessment as a process that is made up of three 
processes:  
• risk identification, a process used to find, recognize, and 
describe risk that could affect mission objectives;  
 
• risk analysis, a process that is used to understand the 
nature, source, and causes of identified risk and estimate 
level of risk; and 
  
• risk evaluation, a process used to compare analysis results 
with risk criteria to determine whether or not a specific 
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level of risk is acceptable or endurable to mission 
objectives (ISO, 2009  p.18)   
 
As information continues to become a critical asset in organizations, it must be 
protected against various sources of unwanted access, external attacks, malicious 
insiders, natural disaster, accidents and/or equipment failure and from within, or external 
to, the organizational boundary (Grimaila et al., 2009a).   All the information held within 
organizational boundaries is subject to cyber attacks.  Organizations must prepare for and 
operate through cyber degradation or attack.   A risk assessment can better prepare an 
organization for an information incident.  The quality of the assessment depends on the 
accuracy of information collected in each step.   NIST advocates for a risk assessment 
methodology, discussed above, that incorporates nine primary steps (Figure 7).  Although 
the risk assessment process is extensive, at a minimum, organizations should complete 
the first step, System Characterization, to manage risk.  In the first step, an organization 
can identify critical ICT resource dependencies, the downstream consumers on these ICT 
resources, and the valuation of systems in terms of how they support mission objectives.  
This information plays a vital role analyzing the impact of an information incident on the 
organization’s mission.  More specifically, when an information incident occurs, decision 
makers at all levels whose missions are affected can be notified in a timely and relevant 
manner to maintain awareness of their critical ICT resources and assure mission success.   
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Figure 7.  Risk Assessment Activities (NIST, 2002) 
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2.14 Mission Assurance 
As risks to ICT have steadily increased, the growing threat has led to increased 
focus on mission assurance.   According to mission assurance doctrine, mission assurance 
consists of measures required to accomplish essential objectives of missions in a 
contested environment, entails prioritizing mission essential functions (MEFs), mapping 
mission dependence on cyberspace, identifying vulnerabilities, and mitigating risk of 
known vulnerabilities (Department of the Air Force, 2010, p.7).    Mission assurance 
ensures that organizations are able to provide assurance for those ICT on which they 
depend to meet mission needs, even when compromised.  When a mission has been 
compromised, it does not have to result in mission failure; instead, the mission is 
degraded to an acceptable level where operations can continue.  Therefore, organizations 
must constantly revisit their risk management strategies to ensure critical ICT that 
support mission objectives are secure (Grimaila et al., 2010).  Although organizations 
cannot prevent every attack, they must be able to defeat an adversary when a cyber attack 
occurs and sustain their missions.  Mission assurance means ensuring that ICT can 
support mission objectives in times of uncertainty: “a deficiency of information and leads 
to inadequate or incomplete understanding” (ISO, 2009).    
Today, organizations have a dependence on critical information embedded in IT 
systems which can be exploited by an adversary as a weakness.  Defending critical ICT 
resources from an adversary is a serious challenge, especially with the use of 
commercial-off-the-shelf products.   “The proliferation of commercially available 
technology will allow adversaries to develop niche capabilities that will threaten, in 
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varying degrees, the successful conduct of operations in areas where the US forces were 
previously unchallenged” (Department of the Air Force, 2010).  Cyberspace operations 
doctrine states that: 
 Adversaries in cyberspace are exploiting low-entry cost, widely available 
resources, and minimal required technological investment to inflict serious 
harm, resulting in an increasing complex and distributed environment.  
They are fielding sophisticated cyberspace systems and experimenting 
with advanced war-fighting concepts.  
 
As sophisticated adversaries continue to exploit vulnerabilities of critical ICT resources 
which organizations depend on for mission success, organizations must prioritize the 
organization’s mission objectives, determine critical information assets that support these 
objectives, and come up with a plan for mitigating cyber threats to critical ICT resources.  
In 2008, the DoD Inspector General published an audit of 436 DoD mission critical IT 
systems and found: 
• 264 system (61 percent) lacked a contingency plan or their owners 
could not provide evidence of a plan 
 
• 358 systems (82 percent) had a contingency plan that had not been 
tested or for which their owners could not provide evidence of 
testing  
 
The audit concluded that “DoD mission-critical systems may not be able to sustain war-
fighter operations during disruptive or catastrophic event” (DoD, 2008).   Ensuring 
organizations can accomplish the mission while in degraded information environment 
requires a wide range of protection measures.  Finally, these protection measures must be 
coordinated within and across organizational boundaries where interdependencies are 
inherently created by reliance on critical information to support mission objectives.   
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2.15 Summary  
 This chapter summarized the literature that is necessary to understand and 
conduct the research presented in this thesis. Recognizing that humans interact with 
systems in their own way and information processing occurs in stages that draws upon 
sensory inputs, Figure 8 shows the research model that will be used to compare the 
existing USAF incident notification process which uses incident notification 
dissemination via email, with the proposed CIMIA incident notification process which 
achieves incident dissemination via pop-up notices.   
 
 
Figure 8.  Research Model 
The purpose of this model is to provide the empirical evidence necessary to test 
the main hypothesis identified in this research that it is important to promptly notify 
decision makers within an organization about cyber incidents in a timely manner so they 
can take appropriate contingency measures and assure their mission.  It is upon this 
model that the experiment methodology in Chapter 3 is based.   
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III. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to describe the hypothetical real-world environment 
in which the research experiment is conducted, explain the experiment design, and 
discusses the statistical methods that were used to analyze the collected data. 
3.2 Research Objective 
No quantitative research exists to measure the effect of timely and relevant 
notification for cyber incident response on mission objectives.  The purpose of this 
experiment is to remedy this deficiency by designing an experiment in a realistic mission 
environment that will provide the empirical evidence necessary to test the main 
hypothesis.  The null and alternate hypotheses are as follows: 
Ho: There is no statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident 
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents. 
Ha: There is a statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident 
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents. 
The main hypothesis for this research was developed on the notion that it is important 
to promptly notify decision makers within an organization about cyber incidents in a 
timely manner so they can take appropriate contingency measures and assure their 
mission.   
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3.3 Experimental Environment Description 
Research personnel comprised of both military and civilian personnel met 
regularly over a six month period to consider a potential environment to evaluate the 
utility of the proposed CIMIA incident notification process.  The first discussions 
centered on the nature of potential experiments, and what needed to be done to ensure 
that the experiment was not biased.  The initial task was to ensure that the experimental 
results would provide the necessary data to test the given hypothesis.  During 
brainstorming sessions, a variety of different experiments were considered to test the 
hypothesis.  Several meetings were held to consider the best operational environment that 
had critical mission-to-information dependencies and could be easily abstracted so that 
test subjects could be drawn from the general population.  The outcome of these meetings 
helped shape the experimental environment and resulted in the selection of the 
Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) as the experimental environment in which to 
conduct the research.   
The realization that it will be difficult to model and simulate the full extent of the 
MOC environment led to the design tradeoffs to identify and select only a subset of the 
MOC tasks for use in the experiment.  The aspects used in this experiment are only 
superficially accurate; the operational environment is not accurate in great detail.  
However, the concept of the scenario is based on the organizational setting and aspects of 
the real-world operational environment.   Adelman suggests that the more accurate the 
simulation along all dimensions, the greater the external validity of the experiment 
(1991).  Accurate representation of the operational environment is particularly important 
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for future experiments as the CIMIA incident notification process is fully developed 
(Adelman, 1991).  The experiment focused on information incidents that involved an 
internal server, and two external databases that are representative of the systems used in 
the MOC along with several aspects of the operational environment.     
The research personnel focused on developing the appropriate case study based 
on the information obtain from the MOC to exploit critical mission-to-information 
dependencies.  Yin has defined a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; using multiple sources of 
evidence; and striving to explain how or why something happened by logically linking 
the data to the propositions supporting one rival hypothesis versus others” (1984, p. 23).   
Using this definition, the case study measured the proposed CIMIA incident notification 
process by demonstrating the feasibility for developing an incident notification process to 
improve the USAF’s incident notification process.   Adelman argues that developers of 
decision support systems (DSS) lack the empirical data supporting the merits of their 
system (1991).  Therefore, to evaluate whether the CIMIA incident notification process 
improves the push method utilized in the USAF, the research personnel created a 
hypothetical scenario to generalize some aspects of the MOC’s operational environment.   
The MOC operates under the maintenance group; it is considered the eyes and 
ears of the maintenance group commander.  The MOC operates around-the-clock, and is 
continuously dependent on information and communications technologies (ICT) 
throughout day-to-day operations to exchange information between numerous units.  To 
do this, MOC personnel work day, swing, and mid shifts where they plan, schedule, and 
manage actions for assigned aircraft.  This information-rich environment must maintain 
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awareness of competing resources based on daily flying schedules and maintenance 
priorities (AFI 21-101, 2010; AF1 21-102, 2010; AFI 21-103, 2010).  MOC personnel are 
responsible for maintaining aircraft readiness per AFI 21-101; they “monitor and 
coordinate sortie production, maintenance production, and execution of the flying and 
maintenance schedules” (p.114).  Aircraft maintenance data collection and 
documentation are tracked in the Maintenance Management Information System (GO81) 
(AFI 21-101, 2010).  This system is highly integrated with a global system called Global 
Decision Support System (GDSS).  Both systems push and/or pull information, and are 
not totally reliant on each other.  Either system is capable of maintaining aircraft 
maintenance data separately if needed should one become unavailable.  For instance, 
GO81 may push/pull aircraft discrepancies and aircraft status to GDSS while GDSS 
pushes/pulls missions, launch, and landing times to GO81.  GDSS is primary utilized to 
check aircraft availability, discrepancies, and monitor the status of the USAF’s fleet of 
aircraft.  Higher levels of command utilize this system for status conditions that affect 
aircrafts ability to perform assigned missions.     
The MOC ensures that the information is accurately entered into the GO81 in a 
timely manner so higher levels of command can determine aircraft availability for 
mission tasking (AFI 21-101, 2010).  If information is not accurately updated in a timely 
manner, it could impair the military mission.  Real-time data updates help reduce ground 
times and improve management of base support functions.  It is apparent that the MOC’s 
mission depends on information that is accurate to conduct operations.  To obtain a better 
understanding, research personnel had the opportunity to visit a MOC.  With the support 
of the MOC’s superintendent, military personnel were interviewed and provided 
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substantial input on the most critical aspects of their operations.  This input was used to 
develop a case study providing a framework for evaluating the proposed CIMIA incident 
notification process.  Based on these findings, two mission objectives were used to 
develop an experiment: 1) ensure aircraft status is reported accurately, and 2) ensure all 
GO81 information is entered accurately and timely.   
Focusing on an information incident, research personnel examined how the MOC 
dealt with the loss of CIA.  Surprisingly, the MOC had excellent contingency measures to 
deal with the loss of availability.  The MOC is not solely dependent on the GO81; in 
contrast, documentation is maintained in parallel to system entries for unanticipated 
availability.  Having the appropriate contingency measures in place when the loss of 
availability occurred would not result in mission failure or severe degradation.  Instead, 
when GO81 was not availability, the MOC documented maintenance information in a log 
book and/or phoned another unit with GDSS access to update the system to ensure 
information was accurately reported.   MOC personnel are used to experiencing the loss 
of availability, but had no knowledge of the loss of either integrity or confidentially.  
However, the mission’s impact was discussed if loss of integrity or loss of confidentially 
occurred.  Consequently, the loss of either CIA would have some impact on the MOC’s 
mission objectives.  Based on this situation, a simple experimental scenario was created 
in which the methods of both cyber incident notifications processes could be evaluated.   
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3.4 Equipment and Facility 
The experiment was conducted in a room at the Air Force Institute of Technology 
on Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.  The room was configured to resemble the operational 
environment of a MOC, as shown in Figure 9.   
A small local area network (LAN) was configured for the experiment using a 
router.  The LAN consisted of two Hp Compaq dc5858 Microtowers with 3.48 Gbytes of 
RAM and 2.69 GHz of hard disk drive.  Each microtower ran independently with 
Windows XP operating system.  The first microtower was used as the workstation for 
subjects.  The workstation included two 20-inch monitors, one Video Graphics Array 
(VGA) and one Digital Visual Interface (DVI) connection.  The subject’s workstation 
hosted email and a graphical interface (GUI) for the database.  The second microtower 
was used as a server for the Domain Name System (DNS), email server, and host system 
for two databases.  Two 30-inch monitors were connected, one VGA and DVI 
connection. 
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Figure 9. Experimental Environment 
3.5 Software Description and Procedures 
 Oracle Database 10g Express Edition for Windows was the database of choice 
because it was free to develop, easy to deploy and distribute, and fast to download.    This 
platform is well documented and has many accessible books, forums, blogs, and articles 
for troubleshooting problems.  The first database developed was GO81.  The MOC 
utilizes GO81 to document aircraft information and exercise related missions to ensure 
100 percent reporting accuracy on aircraft mission capability (AFI 21-101, 2010).  The 
development of the GO81 database focused only on maintenance aspects of timely and 
accurate reporting within the assigned aircraft function of the system.  As shown in 
Figure 10, sixteen fields were selected for the case study scenario to provide relevant 
information about the aircraft’s current mission capability.  The second database, GDSS, 
was designed with the same look and feel of the GO81.  
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Figure 10. Maintenance Management Information System (GO81) 
Headquarters Air Mobility Command utilizes GDSS to have visibility of available 
resources to meet mission requirements.   Communication interfaces between GO81 and 
GDSS allows the exchange of real-time data updates on aircraft status conditions.  The 
design of the GDSS database is similar to the actual system utilized in the Air Force.  
However, only a portion of the information about aircraft owned by the hypothetical 
airlift wing was utilized in the experiment.      
Information contained in the aircraft summary display on GDSS was obtained 
from the GO81 Maintenance Management Information System through user-entered data.  
In the experiment, GO81 pushes updates to GDSS 2 within minutes the information has 
been entered into the database.  Each database has a total of 16 fields, of which only 12 
are the same between the two systems.  The aircraft summary displays provide visibility 
to monitor aircraft resources.  The displays for GO81 and GDSS reflect aircraft owned by 
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the hypothetical airlift wing regardless of the aircraft’s location.  A description of the 
fields in both databases is provided in Appendix D. 
A GUI was developed using NetBeans Integrated Development Environment 
(IDE) 6.9.1.   This free open source IDE provided a JavaFX Composer tool to create and 
layout a GUI to interact with the GO81.   
The email agent used to manage email during the experiment was Mozilla 
Thunderbird, a free open source email client, was installed on the subject’s workstation.   
The email server hMailServer, a free email server for Microsoft Window that supports 
POP3 email protocol, was installed on the server workstation.  The server workstation 
also hosted the DNS server which was Dual DHCP Server 6.72. 
3.6 Experimental Scenario 
 A military scenario was developed that described the mission to be accomplished 
and the tasks that were expected to be performed.  The 663rd Airlift Wing, a fictitious 
organization, at Rickenbacker AFB in Columbus, Ohio, was the operational environment 
for the scenario.  The subjects were presented a power point presentation which provided 
background information about the wing’s mission and how the MOC helps the wing as a 
whole by ensuring the mission is accomplished.  The presentation provides the in 
information in the mission brief script shown in Figure 11.   
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Figure 11. 663rd Mission Brief Script 
Once the subjects understood the wing’s mission, they were told what tasks were 
expected of them.  Each subject in the experiment assumed the role of a Shift Supervisor 
on swing shift who was responsible for ensuring Rickenbacker’s fleet of aircraft was 
maintained.   In this role, the subjects were instructed to keep track of every assigned 
aircraft and the aircraft’s current mission capability.  They ensured timely and accurate 
support of everyday and exercise related missions while managing computer-based 
platforms to include GDSS and GO81.  They were tasked with the crucial responsibility 
of flawless orchestration of maintenance operations which ensures timely and accurate 
support to Headquarters Air Mobility Command.   Figure 12 shows the experiment 
scenario that each subject was briefed.   
663rd Mission Brief Script 
 
The 663 AW supports a worldwide global mobility mission to provide trained 
maintenance specialist for the U.S Air Force’s largest cargo transport aircraft, the C-5 Galaxy 
and C-17 Globalmaster III cargo aircraft.  These aircraft move valuable supplies and people 
in support of Global Reach for America.  The 663rd Maintenance Squadron Maintenance 
Operations Center (MOC), under the direction of the maintenance group commander, 
manages scheduled maintenance to the fleet on a near 24/7 basis to accomplish all operational 
commitments with minimal impact to maintenance personnel, facilities and equipment while 
ensuring optimal use of both time and resources.  They coordinate and control scheduled and 
unscheduled aircraft maintenance to ensure readiness for 18 assigned aircraft.  As the MOC 
coordinates maintenance operations, they ensure timely and accurate support of everyday and 
exercise related missions, implementing daily flying and maintenance schedules to ensure 
optimum utilization of hundreds of maintenance group personnel.  The more than 400 
members of the squadron streamline their technical expertise in supporting C-5 and C-17 
aircraft.  Their mission is to provide global response, world-class systems, support equipment, 
and aircraft maintenance.  All team members of the 663rd Maintenance Squadron play a 
pivotal role in maintaining aircraft and equipment in mission-ready status to ensure 
Headquarters Air Mobility Command’s ability to maintain Global Reach for America.   
 
 
45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Experimental Scenario Script 
Each task was described and subjects received training to ensure they understood 
their role in the experiment. The training provided is discussed below under the pre-
experimental activities. 
3.7 Experimental Design  
The experimental design approach focused on the selection of the appropriate case 
study to represent the different treatment conditions.  According to Keppel, “an 
experiment consists of a carefully work-out and executed plan for the data collection and 
analysis.  Treatment conditions are chosen to focus on particular features of the testing 
experiment” (1982, p. 4).  Furthermore, he explains that “conditions are administrated to 
subjects in such a way that observed differences in behavior can be unambiguously 
attributed to critical differences existing among the various treatment conditions”  
(Keppel, 1982, p. 4).   
This experiment was tailored from factorial experimentation which “permits the 
manipulation of more than one independent treatment in the same experiment” (Keppel, 
Experiment Scenario Script 
 
You have just reported to the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC) for swing duty.  
The day-shift Shift Supervisor has just briefed you on the daily events and gives you a 
backlog of updates to enter into GO81.  The database was unavailable part of the day for 
scheduled maintenance.  As a result, several updates need to be entered into the database for 
accurate status reporting on the 663rd fleet of aircraft.  The scheduled system maintenance on 
GO81 was advertised in advanced and all system users are aware that the system is back 
online.  Your objectives in this study are to accurately enter all data from the data sheets into 
GO81 and ensure the information is accurately pushed to GDSS, monitor email, listen for and 
write down radio communications and answer any calls that come into the MOC based on 
your understanding of the mission. 
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1982, p.20).  Specifically, a 2 x 2 mixed factorial design with a combination of within-
subjects and between-subjects variables was used.  The term “mixed” refers to the 
elements of both within-subject and between-subject designs (Keppel, 1982).  This 
design uses the same subjects with every condition of the research, including the control.  
Keppel explains that subjects serve more than once in the experiment, repeated 
measurements are taken, and treatment effects are associated with differences observed 
within each subject. 
In the 2x2 Mixed Factorial Design shown in Table 2, the design consists of one 
within-subject variable (type of incident notification), with two levels (NOTAM and Pop-
up), and one between-subjects variable (incident notification order), with two levels 
(NOTAM/Pop-up and Pop-up/NOTAM). 
Table 2. 2x2 Mixed Factorial Design 
 
Factor C                                    
Type of Incident Notification 
Factor A                   
Initial Notification 
Factor B            
Subjects Session 1 Session 2 
NOTAM 
S1    S2     S3                             
S8    S9     S10                            
S11   S16   S17                         
S18   S19   S24   S25 
NOTAM Pop-up  
Pop-up 
S4    S5     S6                             
S7    S12    S13                            
S14   S15    S20                         
S21   S22     S23 
Pop-up  NOTAM 
 
In this case, the USAF incident notification process (NOTAM) was one of two 
independent variables, compared to the proposed CIMIA incident notification process 
(Pop-up) being the second independent variable. 
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Subjects who participated in the experiment received random assignment to the 
between-subject variable.  This procedure guaranteed that the treatment condition had an 
equal opportunity of being assigned to a given subject and whatever other uncontrolled 
factors might be present during any testing (Keppel, 1982).  “The critical features of 
random assignment, then, are that each subject-session combination is equally likely to be 
assigned to any one of the treatment and that the assignment of each subject is 
independent of that of the others” (Keppel, 1982, p.16).   
3.8 Pilot Study 
 A pilot study was conducted approximately four weeks before the first 
experiment.  The pilot study was performed with 20 volunteer Air Force Institute of 
Technology graduate students at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton OH.  Because 
experiments involving humans are difficult to design and control, the pilot study was 
used to establish which variables could be controlled and measured, and to reveal any 
deficiencies in the design of the proposed experiment.  Patten states that pilot studies are 
designed to obtain preliminary information on how new treatments and instruments work 
(2009).  That is to say, they can potentially reveal errors in design as well as allow for 
refinement and correction before the actual experiment.  Specifically, the pilot study was 
used to check experimental procedures, operation of equipment to include hardware and 
software (GO81 and GDSS), data collection techniques, and the questionnaire.   
The pilot study gave the researcher the opportunity to practice and receive notable 
remarks from the pilot group.  The lessons learned in the pilot study were weaknesses in 
the experimental procedures related to training and clarification issues in the 
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questionnaire.  The pilot study group received a training session that included all the 
expected tasks to be performed.  The training session was not originally divided into 
sessions to allow practice and complete understanding before receiving instruction on the 
next task.  Modifications to the experimental procedures resulted in the subjects receiving 
training in stages to allow for practice after instruction on each task.  
 The most notable remarks received from the pilot group referred to the 
questionnaire.  Originally, the questionnaire asked open-ended questions.   Many of the 
responses received did not answer the intended question and several subjects asked for 
clarification before responding.   As a result, several questions were modified to improve 
clarity and the open-ended questions were changed to an 8-point Likert scale response.   
3.9 Subjects  
The subjects used in this experiment were drawn from the graduate student 
population at the Air Force Institute of Technology and undergraduate student population 
at Wright State University located in Dayton, Ohio.   Participation was completely 
voluntary. 
3.10 Experiment Procedures 
 Prior to their arrival, the subject’s were randomly assigned a subject number 
which determined the experimental design block for the experiment, as shown in Figure 
9.  Subjects did not know in advance about the experimentation process, nor did they 
have any prior knowledge of what was expected of them.  They were told that the 
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purpose of the experiment was to evaluate a prototype software tool investigating an Air 
Force program in a simulated real-world situation.   
3.10.1 Pre-experimental Activities 
The first pre-experimental activity was the administration of the consent form.  
The consent form was reviewed in detail to ensure each subject understood.  Next, the 
experiment scenario was conveyed and a short presentation (mission brief discussed 
above) was presented which provided background information about the scenario.   
Another pre-experimental task explained the experimental environment.  Subjects 
received training on the tasks they were expected to perform.  The training was 
segmented into stages that explained each task to be performed.  This allowed subjects 
the opportunity to practice what was instructed immediately which prevented them from 
receiving too much information at once.  In the first portion of training, they were 
introduced to GO81.   
 Operation of the GO81 database for subjects was relatively straightforward.  The 
subjects needed to understand how to bring up the data entry screen, enter data from a 
data sheet (Appendix F), and change data.  These topics were fully addressed and 
discussed during a “hands-on” training session.  After specific instruction, the subjects 
spent eight minutes in a training session to become familiarized with the data sheets and 
data entry screen.  They were instructed to locate every field between the data sheet and 
data entry screen, and verify the information on the entry screen was correct before 
saving the information in GO81.  In order to enter data into GO81, the subject had to 
select the aircraft tail number (from data sheet) that required an update.   This was 
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accomplished by clicking on any part of the row with the aircraft’s tail number.   Once 
clicked, the data entry screen would pop-up for that tail number.  After the subject 
entered all the data from the data sheet into the entry form and clicked save, the 
information was immediately saved in GO81.  Within two minutes, the information was 
pushed to GDSS 2.   Once the subject was comfortable with the task, the second training 
stage instructed was how to verify information between GO81 and GDSS. 
 The process of verifying information between the two systems was simple.  The 
two 30-inch monitors connected to the server displayed GO81 and GDSS respectively.  
The subjects were instructed to visibly compare the information in GO81 and GDSS.  By 
looking at the row of the tail number in GO81 and the same tail number in GDSS, the 
subject could verify that the information was accurately pushed from GO81 to GDSS.   
This portion of the training session was intended to familiarize the subjects with the 
common fields between the databases and verify the information they previously entered 
was accurate in GDSS.  The next training stage was instruction on how to use email. 
The subjects received instruction on how to use the basic functions of Mozilla 
Thunderbird email client.  These functions included how to open, send, delete and read 
email.  The last training stage included the use and operation of the telephone and radio.  
 The operation of the telephone and radio were both straightforward.   Telephone 
instructions were given and a list of frequently called numbers was available on speed 
dial.  The radio was simulated through the desktop speakers for one-way transmission.  
The subjects did not have to interact with the radio; they were instructed to listen for and 
write down all radio transmissions.  All transmissions were broadcast twice.  If the 
 
51 
 
transmission was unclear or not recorded in a timely manner, the subjects were asked to 
write the time of the broadcast.   
Finally, subjects received detailed instruction on how to complete the NASA 
workload assessment.  They were given the opportunity to practice and ask any questions 
on how to complete the assessment.   
In addition, the subjects received a continuity binder (Appendix D) that included 
information covered in the training session.  The continuity binder also included a graph 
of all the ICT that the subjects depended on during the experiment.  Each of the tasks was 
accomplished with one of the available resources.    
3.10.2 Experimental Session 
The subject’s objectives were to complete all given updates from a datasheet into 
GO81, monitor email, listen for and write down radio transmissions, and answer any calls 
that came into the simulated MOC environment.   Subjects were asked to input the 
information from the datasheets into GO81 and verify that the information was 
successfully updated.  The subjects had to actively monitor the accuracy of GO81 and, 
within two minutes, ensure the same information was updated and reflected accurately in 
GDSS.  Some information that subjects entered was manipulated, changed or altered, and 
made unavailable as part of the experiment.  The subjects experienced three types of 
information loss or modification by manipulation, representing losses of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA).  These manipulations took the form of notices directly to 
the subject from the two incident notification platforms.  The USAF incident notification 
process utilized a push method process in the form of an email.  The CIMIA incident 
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notification process utilized a subscribe and pull process (discussed in Chapter 2) in the 
form of a pop-up notification following a cyber incident.   
The experiment was divided into two sessions in which subjects were required to 
complete the same set of tasks.  Each session of the experiment included the three types 
of manipulation.  To induce cyber attacks that resulted in the loss of integrity and loss of 
availability, incorrect information was deliberately presented, information between the 
two systems was deliberately mismatched, and/or either system was made unavailable.  
The loss of confidentiality resulted in a breach to the intranet web server by an adversary.  
The server contained a weekly flying schedule.  The subjects were not informed that 
some of the information they updated in the database was manipulated, altered, and not 
available as part of the experiment.  At the conclusion of the experiment, the true intent 
of the experiment was debriefed to all subjects. 
Once the experiment started, the subjects were presented with the three types of 
manipulation in each session based on their progress of completing the datasheets.   
Additionally, each subject was presented distracting information in the form of emails, 
radio updates, and calls that had to be acknowledged and, in some cases, required a 
course of action.  The manipulations and distractions were applied in the same sequence 
and at approximately the same time during each session as shown in Figures 13 and 14.  
In each session, subjects were given 30 minutes to complete all given tasks.   
Immediately following the first session of the experiment, subjects completed a rating 
(NASA TLX) workload assessment.  Upon completion, subjects were given a 10-15 
break before starting the next session.   In the second session, subjects were asked to 
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complete the same tasks followed by two additional workload assessments, one rating 
and weights.   
 
Figure 13. Cyber Incident timeline by data sheet 
 
 
Figure 14. Distractions timeline by minutes 
3.10.3 Post-experimental Activities  
 At the completion of the experiment all subjects completed a questionnaire 
identical to that shown in Appendix B.  The post-experimental questionnaire was 
administered to garner information in the following areas: 
Start
Cyber incident
Cyber incident
Cyber incident
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Cyber Incident timeline by data sheet
Start
Email
NOTAM
Radio update
Email
NOTAM
Email
Radio update
Email Email
Experiment Ends
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Distractions timeline by minutes 
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(1) Gather some demographics of the subjects in terms of age, gender, 
academic level 
(2) Subjects self-assessment evaluation of their performance   
(3) Evaluation of the incident notifications usefulness  
(4) Indirect measures of situational awareness 
Subjects were debriefed and their questions about the experiment were answered.  
The experiment concluded when the questionnaire was completed and the subject’s 
questions were answered.  In total, each experimental session required approximately 2 
hours per subject. 
3.11 Questionnaire Design  
 This research sought to not only objectively measure the temporal aspect of an 
cyber incident notification required for mission personnel to recognize and respond, but 
also to measure through more subjective means the perceptions of the subjects, self-
assessment.  According to Endsley, the most commonly used means of subjectively 
evaluating operator’s concepts on SA involves direct questioning.  Thus, “the 
measurement of SA provides a useful index for evaluation system design and training 
techniques and for better understanding human cognition” (Endsley & Garland, 2000, p. 
24).  In addition,   
One of the chief reasons for measuring SA has been for the purpose of 
evaluating new system and interface design in order to determine the 
degree to which new technology or design concepts actually improve or 
degrade operator SA, it is necessary to systematically evaluate them based 
on a measure of SA, thus providing determination of which ideas have 
merit and which have unforeseen negative consequences. 
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The questionnaire was employed to establish the subjects perception of critical aspects of 
environmental elements in the experiment to determine their level of SA and to perform 
comparative analysis of responses associated with each session.  The intent was to use an 
ordinal scale similar to the Likert 7-point scale.  Although the Likert scale is commonly 
understood and well known, the survey instrument used is not a validated measuring 
device for SA or DSS.  Instead of the traditional 7-point Likert scale, an 8-point scale was 
used for ease of analysis.  The development phase of the questionnaire was extracted 
from guidance in the U.S Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social 
Sciences’ Questionnaire Construction Manual and the human factors and ergonomics 
field of study on questionnaires.   
 In addition to the ordinal scale questions, multiple choice questions were also 
administered in the questionnaire.  These questions were administrated to obtain a single 
answer response for demographic information such as gender, age group and academic 
level and multiple answer selections.   
3.12 Data Collection Techniques 
 During each session of the experiment three log files were used to record time 
stamps of the events that occurred.  The first log file recorded the data entered in GO81.  
This log provided the time stamp of every data sheet entered, as well as what data was 
entered and shared between the two databases.  It also provided the start and end of the 
experiment for each subject.  The researcher used this information to measure part of the 
subject’s performance outcome that included the number of sheets completed during each 
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session of the experiment, accuracy of the information entered by the subject, and to 
ensure the order of the sheets entered were consistent among subjects.  
The second log was an automated telephone file log.  This log provided the time 
stamp of each call placed and destination of the call. The researcher used this information 
to record the response time.  The response time was calculated from the time the cyber 
incident occurred (which was a predefined time previously discussed in Figure 13) to the 
time the subject took a course of action.   
The last log was a two-part evaluation file that contained the results of the NASA 
TLX workload assessment.  The NASA TLX workload assessment is a subjective 
technique that relies on a multidimensional construct to derive an overall workload score 
based on weight averages of ratings on six subscales: mental demand, physical demand, 
temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration level.  Slick et al. (2005) comment 
that: 
As defined, workload is task-dependent, because it generally refers to some part 
of the relationship between an operator and the task being performed.  There three are 
key issues associated with measuring workload: First, workload is subjective in the sense 
that individuals may use different criteria to judge their own workload, so there is no way 
to compare subjective workload across individuals.  Second, individuals’ criteria for 
judging workload may change over time, as the individual becomes more proficient at the 
primary task.  Third, given that workload is subjective, there is no way to assess whether 
individuals’ subjective ratings include all pertinent aspects of the task.  
 
The NASA TLX consists of two-parts: ratings and weights.  Ratings for each of 
the six subscales are obtained from the subjects following the completion of each session.  
A numerical rating ranging from 0 to 100 is assigned to each scale.  Weights are 
determined by the subjects’ choices of pairwise comparisons between all possible 
combinations of the subscales, approximately 15.  Weights are collected at completion of 
 
57 
 
session 2.  The ratings and weights are then combined to calculate a weighted average for 
an overall workload score.  The workload assessment was used to assess the subjective 
ratings of workload between the presents and absence of the treatment.  The first part of 
the file provides the subjects individual ratings of session 1 and 2 respectively.  Part two 
of the file provided the weights evaluation that pertained to the workload experience of 
the subject during both sessions of the experiment.   
The data collection processes was standardized across all subjects by 
implementing a Data Collection Form (Appendix E).  The form was used to record the 
logged information discussed above.  In addition, the form was used to record observed 
behavior that contributed to the subject’s decision making activities.   
The questionnaire asked specific questions that related to the decision making 
process of the subjects, as well as pointed questions that dealt with the conditions.  For 
this reason, a pre-process questionnaire was not used.  The researcher did not what to 
sensitize the subjects to the treatment.  This problem is what Patten refers to as pretest 
sensitization (2009).  The pretest sometimes causes problems by exposing subjects to 
what would be covered in the experiment (2009).   To overcome this problem, only a 
post-process questionnaire was used.   
3.13 Statistical Analysis  
According to Keppel, one of the important tasks in summarizing the outcome of 
the experiment is by means of statistical indices and procedures (1982).  Keppel suggests 
that the goal is to extract as much meaningful information as possible from the 
experiment.  Although several statistical techniques were utilized in this study, one 
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method used for evaluating the primary outcome examined the distribution of the data to 
determine whether these distributions were significantly different.  For instance, should 
data from the CIMIA incident notification process result in a significantly different 
distribution compared to the USAF’s incident  notification process, one would conclude 
that the treatment had a significant effect on the outcome variable being evaluated.  
Based on the results of the sample statistical test, one could then make inferences about 
the feasibility of the proposed CIMIA incident notification process being utilized within 
the USAF.  Hypothesis testing was used to determine the results of the data collected. 
 A hypothesis is a “prediction of the outcome of a study” (Patten, 2009, p. 15).  It 
asserts that the treatment will generate some type of effect.  In this study, a null 
hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are considered for hypothesis testing.  According to 
Keppel, the research hypothesis is “translated into a set of statistical hypothesis, which 
are then evaluated in light of the obtained data” (1982, p.24).  He explains that the 
statistical hypothesis “consists of a set of precise hypothesis about the parameters of the 
different treatment populations.”  The null and alternative hypotheses are two examples 
of the statistical hypothesis which “are mutually exclusive or incompatible statements 
about the treatment parameters” (Keppel, 1982, p.24).  The hypothesis statement is the 
null hypothesis, Ho, which will be tested and rejected as false.  The alternative 
hypothesis, Ha, will in turn be accepted as true when the Ho is rejected (Keppel, 1982). 
Comparing the difference between means to the variability within contestant distribution 
is the basis for analysis of variance.   
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3.14 Test Selection 
An analysis of variance, abbreviated as ANOVA, is a method for hypothesis 
testing that compares differences between two or more means to determine if the 
averages are likely to be the same, or likely to be different.  An ANOVA is an analysis of 
the variation present in an experiment.  It is a test of the hypothesis that the variation in 
an experiment is no greater than that due to the normal variation of individuals’ 
characteristics and error in their measurement (Keppel, 1980).  Keppel (1982) discusses 
that the tests in an ANOVA are based on the F-ratio which is the variation due to an 
experimental treatment or effect divided by the variation due to experimental error.  
ANOVA is considered a parametric test which is “one that requires data from one of the 
larger catalogue of distributions that statisticians have described and for data to be 
parametric certain assumptions must be true” (Field, 2005, p. 63).   The major 
assumptions of ANOVA are: 
• Normally distributed 
• Homogeneity of variance  
• Independence 
Keppel argues that violating the normality of distribution, homogeneity of 
variance and independence of score in treatment conditions does not appear to have any 
practical significance for statistical analysis of an experiment because they apply equally 
to the factorial design.  However, when data is not normal, remedial measures for non-
normality is data transformation which is applied so that the data appear to more closely 
meet the assumptions of a statistical inference procedure (Field, 2005).   Homogeneity of 
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variance is that the variance of the populations is equal.  “ANOVA works well even this 
assumption is violated except in the case where there are unequal numbers of subjects in 
the various groups” (Fields, 2005, p.97).  Violations of independence produce a non-
normal distribution, which results in invalid F ratios.  However, independence 
assumption is met through the random assignment of subject to conditions (Keppel, 
1980).    
3.15 Summary  
 This chapter presented the research methodology for this study.  The conceptual 
framework was defined and the research objective, case study and experimental design 
were summarized.  The data collection procedure and data analysis methods were also 
discussed.  Finally, this chapter concluded with the test selection used in the experiment 
to be analyzed in the following chapter. 
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IV. Results 
4.1 Introduction 
 The previous chapter identified the methodology for the collection and analysis of 
data in order to test the hypothesis stated in chapter 1.  This chapter applies the research 
methodology and discusses the results.  Specifically, this chapter provides an overview of 
the demographics of the test subjects, presents and analyzes the results of the statistical 
testing regime, provides a discussion of the interpretation of results, and presents 
additional related findings.   
4.2 Subject Demographics 
  Data on three demographic variables were collected.  These variables included 
age, gender and academic level (Table 3).  These variables were gathered from 13 
graduate students at the Air Force Institute of Technology and 12 undergraduate students 
from Wright State University located in Dayton, Ohio.  The majority of the subjects were 
in the age groups 18-30 (64%).  There were more male subjects (76%) than female 
(24%).  Thirty-six percent of the subjects did not have a degree, while 40% of the 
subjects had a Bachelor.   
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Table 3.  Demographic information on subjects 
Demographic Factor 
(N=25) Frequency 
% of 
total 
Age 
18-30 16 64 
30-45 8 32 
45-60 1 4 
Gender Male 19 76 
Female 6 24 
Academic                
Level 
No 
Degree 9 36 
Associate 4 16 
Bachelor 10 40 
Master 2 8 
4.3 Deviations in the Methodology   
There were a few deviations in the methodology that are discussed below. 
• A total of 25 subjects participated in the experiment; however, the expected 
number of data points was not collected.  Each subject was to receive a total of 6 
treatment conditions (Integrity, Availability and Confidentiality with and without 
the treatment) for a total of 150 data points.  However, the majority of the subjects 
only received 4 of the 6 treatment conditions for a total of 96 data points shown in 
Table 3.    The subject’s performance of the tasks was self-paced and limited to 
two 30 minutes sessions.  Because of this each subject did not receive the 
expected number of treatment conditions.  Additionally, 1 of the 25 subjects only 
received half of the treatment conditions; hence, that subject was removed from 
the sample size leaving a remaining 24.  The median response times was taken for 
all cyber incidents for each subject for the NOTAM (USAF) and pop-up (CIMIA) 
excluding confidentiality.  For example, if subject 4 responded to an integrity 
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pop-up in 45 seconds and an availability pop-up in 210 seconds, the response time 
recorded for the CIMIA incident notification process was 128 seconds.  If only 1 
of the 2 cyber incidents was received, that response time was recorded.  Table 4 
shows how the data was combined.   
Table 4.  Collected data points 
Type of Cyber Incident Treatment Condition  
NOTAM Pop-up Total 
Integrity 22 21 43 
Availability 19 20 39 
Confidentiality  5 9 14 
Total 46 50 96 
 
Table 5.  Combined data points 
      Treatment Condition  
      NOTAM Pop-up Total  
Cyber Incidents 13 11 24 
13 11 24 
Total 26 22 48 
 
• The dependent variable, response time, is not a normal distribution which violates 
one of the fundamental assumptions of an ANOVA for the test to work properly 
and yield good results.  Therefore, in an attempt to normalize the distribution 
somewhat, the response variable was transformed.  A reciprocal transformation 
was performed on the response variable for the combined data points based on the 
formula: y’ = 1/y.   Where y is the value of the original variable and y’ is the 
value of the transformed variable used in the analyses for response time 
(DeCoster, 2001; Field, 2005). 
 
64 
 
4.4 Results 
The research objective was to compare the USAF incident notification process to the 
CIMIA incident notification process with respect to the response time to recognize and 
take proper contingency actions following a cyber incident.  Response time was 
measured in terms of the length of time it took a subject to report that a cyber incident 
had occurred.  The main hypothesis for this research was developed based on the notion 
that it is important to promptly notify decision makers within an organization about cyber 
incidents in a timely manner so they can take appropriate contingency measures and 
assure their mission.  The null and alternate hypotheses were: 
Ho: There is no statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident 
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents. 
Ha: There is a statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident 
notification processes in the length of time required for mission personnel to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions in response to cyber incidents. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to interpret interaction effects and main 
effects on response time of the type of incident notification (Type: NOTAM or Pop-up) 
and the initial incident notification utilized by the subject during the experiment (Initial: 
NOTAM or Pop-up).  The interaction effect is between type of incident notification and 
initial notification.  The main effects are the response time difference between the types 
of incident notification.  Initial notification is the between-subjects variable with two 
levels (NOTAM and Pop-up) shown in Table 5.  The type of incident notification is the 
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within-subjects variables with two levels (NOTAM and Pop-up) shown in Table 6.  
These two independent variables had an effect on the dependent variable (response time), 
called the main effect.  Keppel (1980) suggests that the order of testing null hypotheses 
should be in a rational sequence.  The first step is to evaluate is the interaction before 
analyzing main effects.  The significance of this test determines the next step in the 
analyses.   According to Keppel (1980), a significant interaction requires further 
interpretation of the data where as a non-significant interaction indicates two independent 
variables.  Figure 14 shows a non-significant interaction. 
    
Table 6. Between-Subjects Factors 
Between-Subjects Factors 
  N 
Initial Notification NOTAM 13 
POP-UP 11 
 
Table 7. Within-Subjects Factors 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Type of Incident Notification Dependent Variable 
NOTAM NOTAM Response Time 
POP-UP POPUP Response Time 
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Figure 15.  Response Time Initial notification for NOTAM and Pop-up 
 
 
Table 8.  Descriptive Statistics for Response Time 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Initial Notification Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N 
NOTAM Response Time NOTAM 623 322 13 
POP-UP 358 278 11 
Total 502 325 24 
POP-UP Response Time NOTAM 249 179 13 
POP-UP 165 165 11 
Total 211 174 24 
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Table 9. Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
  F df1 df2 Significance 
NOTAM 1.179 1 22 .289 
POP-UP .000 1 22 .991 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Initial Notification  
 Within Subjects Design: Type of Incident Notification 
 
Table 10. Analysis of Variance for Response Time 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR RESPONSE TIME       
  
      
  
SOURCE  DF SS MS F P 
  
      
  
INTIAL NOTIFICATION (A) 1 0.001 0.001 4.593 0.043 
  
      
  
SUBJECT (B) 
     
  
  
      
  
A*B 
  
22 0.005 0.000 
 
  
  
      
  
TYPE OF INCIDENT NOTIFICATION (C)  1 0.001 0.001 7.629 0.011 
  
      
  
A*C 
  
1 0.001 0.001 2.771 0.110 
        A*B*C     22 0.004 0.001 
    
      
  
TOTAL     47 0.012       
Note:  ANOVA is based on the reciprocal transformation data 
 
 Repeated measures ANOVA found that there was not an interaction between 
initial notification and type of incident notification (F(1,22)=2.271, p = .110).  This 
indicates that the two independent variables are representative of simple effect tests.  
Therefore, the next step in the analysis was to focus on the average effects of the two 
independent variables and interpret the experimental results in terms of the main effects 
shown in Table 8 (Keppel, 1980).  The dependent variable, response time, was made 
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more normal by the reciprocal function.  There was homogeneity of variance between for 
the NOTAM and Pop-up as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of error variances.  
Simple main effects analysis showed that initial notification is significant using a 
significance level of .05 (F(1,22) = 4.593, p =.043) and there is a difference between the 
type of incident notification process using a significance level of .05 (F(1,22) =7.629, p 
=.011).  Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and it was concluded that there is a 
statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident notification processes in 
the length of time required for mission personnel to recognize and take proper 
contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.   
4.5 Additional Results 
4.4.1 Workload Assessment  
The NASA TLX workload assessment response variable is a percentage derived 
from count data which violates one of the assumptions of using ANOVA.   The most 
important assumption is that the data are normally distributed with no imposed limits.  
Clearly this is not true of percentages, which cannot be less than 0 nor more than 100.  
Therefore, in an attempt to normalize the data, percentages were converted to arcsine 
values.  The arcsine transformation moves very low or very high values toward the 
center, giving them more theoretical freedom to vary.  An arcsine-square transformation 
was performed on the response variable to make the percent data normal (Field, 2005). 
The arcsine value used in the analyses is for amount of workload experienced. The 
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assessment of subject’s workload during the experiment revealed that the overall 
perceived workload experienced among subjects was consistent.   
 
Figure 16. Workload score Initial Notification for NOTAM and Pop-up 
 
Table 11.  Descriptive Statistics for Workload score 
Descriptive Statistics 
  Initial Notification Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N 
NOTAM Workload NOTAM 36.7296 13.9583 13 
POP-UP 40.9140 14.4112 11 
Total 38.6475 14.0173 24 
POP-UP Workload NOTAM 33.9759 16.0652 13 
POP-UP 44.8942 10.4745 11 
Total 38.9801 14.6028 24 
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Table 12.  Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
  F df1 df2 Significance 
NOTAM  .017 1 22 .897 
POP-UP  2.104 1 22 .161 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + Initial Notification  
 Within Subjects Design: Type of Incident Notification 
 
Table 13.  Analysis of Variance Table for Workload 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR WORKLOAD       
  
      
  
SOURCE  DF SS MS F P 
  
      
  
INTIAL NOTIFICATION (A) 1 679.522 679.522 1.931 0.179 
  
      
  
SUBJECT (B) 
     
  
  
      
  
A*B 
  
22 7743.074 351.958 
 
  
  
      
  
TYPE OF INCIDENT NOTIFICATION (C)  1 4.482 4.482 0.114 0.739 
  
      
  
A*C 
  
1 135.096 135.096 3.432 .077 
        A*B*C     22 866.085 39.368     
  
      
  
TOTAL     47 9428.259       
Note:  ANOVA is based on arcsine value 
  
Figure 15 indicates that there is no interaction between the initial notification and 
the type of incident notification.  The dependent variable, workload score, was made 
more normal by arcsine transformation.  There was homogeneity of variance between the 
NOTAM and Pop-up as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of error variances.  The 
ANOVA found that there is not a significant interaction using a significance level of .05 
(F(1,22) = 3.432, p =.077) .  Simple effects analysis showed that the main effect of initial 
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notification on perceived workload was not significant (F(1,22) = 1.939, p = .0179) and 
similarly, the main effect of the type of incident notification on perceived workload was 
not significant (F(1,22) = .114, p = .0739).  The marginal means for the amount of 
workload experienced in the USAF incident notification process (38.6475) and the 
proposed CIMIA incident notification process (38.9801) are not statistically different 
(Table 9).   
4.5.2 Questionnaire results  
 The post-questionnaire was used for a self-assessment to perform comparative 
analysis of responses associated with each session.  The following dependent variables of 
interest were analyzed with respect to the presents of the CIMIA incident notification 
process.  There was one exception; the first question refers to an overall comfort level of 
the experiment, not between sessions.  A summation is shown using the sample mode and 
median in Table 8.  Overall, subjects were more comfortable during the second session of 
the experiment, which was expected.  In addition, a slight increase in performance is 
indicated between sessions.   
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Table 14. Comparison of subject's self assessment 
 
 Part of the questionnaire was also used to obtain an indirect measurement of SA.  
Because subjective measures of SA are limited in the veracity of self-rating and observer 
rating of SA (Endsley, 1995), the questionnaire asked questions directed at all three 
levels of SA.  Although, the questionnaire is not a validate technique for measuring SA, it 
indicates subjects SA level based on their understanding of information available in the 
experiment environment.  A summary of the SA response measures are shown in Table 
11. 
Table 15. Summary of SA response measures 
 
Lickert scale item Sample mode Sample median
Subject comfort level with the experiment 7 6
Subject’s comfort level with session one 5 5
Subject’s comfort level with session two 7 7
Subject’s perception of NOTAMs usefulness 1 3
Subject’s perception of CIMIA notification usefulness 8 7
Subject’s self-assessment of performance in session one 5 5
Subject’s confidence of performance rating in session two 6 6
Subject’s self-assessment of performance in session two 6 6
Subject’s confidence of performance rating in session one 6 6
Response Measure
Session 1 
w/o CIMIA
Session 2 
w/CIMIA
Session 1 
w/CIMIA
Session 2 
w/o CIMIA
Subjects detected an error in data 0.8461 1 0.9897 1
Subjects perception of persons affected by cyber incident 3.5384 4.6153 4.4822 4.5333
Subjects notified someone of cyber incident 0.6923 0.923 0.978 0.9585
Subjects notified who they percieved to be affected by cyber incident 1.5384 2.6153 2.75 4.5825
Notes:
1.  Mean scores are compared by session.
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4.6 Summary 
 A significant difference in the type of incident notification between the USAF 
incident notification process and the proposed CIMIA incident notification process was 
observed.  Simple main effects analysis showed that there is a difference between the 
type of incident notification process using a significance level of .05 (F(1,22) =7.629, p 
=.011).  Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and it was concluded that there is a 
statistical difference between the existing and CIMIA incident notification processes in 
the length of time required for mission personnel to recognize and take proper 
contingency actions in response to cyber incidents.  The proposed CIMIA incident 
notification reduced response times by 58 percent.  This reduction was a result 
independent of whether or not the CIMIA notification was the initial notification in the 
experiment.   The additional findings from the NASA TLX workload assessment and 
post-questionnaire suggest relative performance indicators in regards to the CIMIA 
incident notification process and indirect measurements of SA.  The following chapter 
will discuss and interpret the results of this research and make recommendations for 
future research.   
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V. Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Review 
 The result of this research support the Cyber Incident Mission Impact Assessment 
project, whose purpose is to provide decision makers with timely notification and 
relevant mission impact estimation, from the instant an information incident is declared, 
until the incident is fully remediated.  This study demonstrated a proof-of-concept in that 
it provided quantitative research to measure the effect of timely and relevant notification 
for cyber incident response on mission objectives.   
 The case study focused on the top two mission objectives representative of those 
found in an operational Maintenance Operations Center (MOC):  1) ensure aircraft status 
is reported accurately, and 2) ensure all information is entered accurately and timely into 
the Maintenance Management Information System (GO81).   The case study provided 
experimental control, but simultaneously allowed enough flexibility to perform 
operational decision making tasks.  This study objective was to compare the USAF 
incident notification process to the CIMIA incident notification process approach by 
evaluating both real-time response times following a cyber incident. 
 A hypothetical scenario was developed using a fictitious MOC to induce 
manipulations that resulted in the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability posing 
a security incident to critically dependent information and communications technologies 
(ICT).   The research evaluated the two incident notification processes by measuring the 
response time from the time a cyber incident occurred until it was recognized and a 
contingency action was taken by the subject.   
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5.2 Findings 
The initial notification in the experiment contributed to the performance of the 
subjects in the second session of the experiment. The initial notification was significant 
(F(1, 22) = 4.593, p =.043), which indicates that subjects had a significantly better 
response time overall with pop-up notification.  The subjects that received the NOTAM 
as the initial notification performed worse than the subjects that received the pop-up first.  
Perhaps the subjects the received the pop-up first were just better at the task compared to 
the subjects receiving the NOTAM initially.  Alternatively, the pop-up could have been 
some type of learning stimulus that contributed to improved performances that were 
observed.  Subject’s performance in response to the NOTAM in the second session of the 
experiment was better after being exposed to the pop-up.   In each instance, the pop-up 
had a positive effect on performance, always encouraged better performance. 
As predicted in Ha, the proposed CIMIA incident notification process had a 
statistical difference in the response time for subjects to recognize and take proper 
contingency actions in response to cyber incidents (F(1,22) =7.629, p =.011).  The data 
from the experimental conditions, shown in Table 5, provides insight that differentiates 
the two incident notification processes.  The proposed CIMIA incident notification 
process reduces the response time as indicated in the mean thresholds. Subjects 
performed better regardless of when the proposed CIMIA incident notification process 
was received.  The shortest response time was 11 seconds while the longest was 700.  
There are several reasons that could possibly explain why subjects took longer to 
respond: 
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• Subjects perhaps were inattentive because of the distractions in the experimental 
environment (e.g. emails and radio communications). 
• Subjects perhaps did not completely understand the pop-up which required them 
to investigate the information in their environment before responding.  It may 
have taken some subjects longer to recognize the meaning of the sensation, 
mental processing time. 
• Subjects perhaps were trying to correct the discrepancies themselves before 
responding. 
• Subjects perhaps did not have higher levels of SA immediately; they may not 
have realized what was happening and what would happen by not responding 
sooner.  
These findings are consists with Ensley’s performance-based measures of SA.  
Performance-based measurements evaluate the real-life actions of a subject and only 
make inferences to SA.  However, using direct testable response gives a more concise 
measurement of SA, which “requires a discernible, identifiable action from the operator” 
(Endsley, 2000, p.203).  The fact that subjects had to observe what was going on in their 
environment (information available), make an assessment about the current state 
(information processing), and understand that an action was required (an alert) is an 
indication of levels 1 and 2 of SA.  According to Endsley, different measures of SA can 
be defined by the points in the decision making process.  Once subjects understood that 
something was wrong in their environment, they made a decision about the projected 
future state of the system and perceived a need to take a course of action.  The actions 
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taken by the subjects in response to the proposed CIMIA incident notification process are 
testable responses that reinforce inferred higher levels of SA.   
 In response to the four questions that indirectly measured SA, the mean scores 
increased in the second session of the experiment.  As indicated by more errors being 
detected, number of personnel identified to be affected by the cyber incident, whether 
someone was notified, and persons actually notified of a cyber incident. Clearly, subjects 
had higher levels of SA and performed more successfully in the second session of the 
experiment which consequentially increased the number of discrepancies reported from 
the induced manipulations of cyber attacks.  Subjects that received the NOTAM initially 
responded only 50 percent of the time to discrepancies, while 92 percent responded after 
being exposed to the pop-up.  Conversely, subjects that were exposed to the pop-up 
initially responded 92 percent of the time to discrepancies and performance increased in 
the second session with 100 percent.  Having the proposed CIMIA incident notification 
process initially perhaps alerted the subject to search more closely for discrepancies in 
the second session of the experiment.    
The subjects preferred the proposed CIMIA incident notification process over the 
USAF incident notification process (rated not very useful).  Based on the results from the 
post-questionnaire (reference Table 10), subject responses to the usefulness of the pop-up 
was extremely positive.  This indicates that the subjects found the pop-up useful to 
identify discrepancies and improve their level of SA based on their performance and 
response time.   
The NASA TLX workload assessment did not differ between the type of incident 
notification (F(1,22) = .114, p = .0739).  This indicates that the proposed CIMIA incident 
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notification process did not manifest as increases or decreases in workload.  Although the 
proposed CIMIA incident notification process improved performance there was no 
change in subjective measures of workload.  The task demand between sessions of the 
experiment did not change, which in turn would not cause the subject to exert more 
effort, thereby not affecting their perceived workload.  This suggests that the assessment 
of the workload is not sensitive to the type of incident notification.  In addition, subjects 
could have perceived the tasks as easy and not have associated the type of incident 
notification with perceived workload.  The performance-workload association is 
interesting in that increased performance is observed but not accompanied by increased 
workload.  It was expected that workload manifest in terms of the amount of information 
to be processed for subject to have higher levels of SA.    
 Finally, analysis was conducted on all demographic factors.  No demographic 
factors segregate itself significantly among the sample population (e.g. age, gender or 
academic level).        
5.3 Limitations 
 Overall, the subjects performed significantly better than expected with the 
proposed CIMIA incident notification process than the USAF incident notification 
process.  The response rate increased 58 percent with the CIMIA incident notification 
process.  However, this study was limited in several ways because of the scarcity of 
subjects. 
 A limitation to this study exists within the sampling population in that only 25 
subjects participated, with the majority being freshmen from a civilian institute.  
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Although the CIMIA project is being developed for a military environment, it is expected 
to provide utility to any organization that exhibits critical temporal mission-to-
information dependencies (Grimaila et al., 2009b).  The sample population was not 
entirely representative of the general public and did not equate to personnel in operational 
positions.   
 As stated before, the within-subject design was selected because of the scarcity of 
subjects.  All subjects performed moderately better in the second session than the first 
session of the experiment, which could have been the result of a carryover effect.  Keppel 
(1980) suggest that the “primary problem is the influence on the subjects’ behavior of 
residual effects from previous conditions combing with the currently administered 
treatment” (p.177).  Therefore, it is not always clearly distinguishable which particular 
condition may have caused a response.  In such a case, the proposed CIMIA incident 
notification process could have alerted a subject to a sense of urgency.  In addition, the 
use of a within-subject design also limited the number of intended treatments.   
The experimental design originally was suppose to test all three adverse events 
that threaten CIA.  However, the majority of the subjects only received the loss of 
availability and loss of integrity.  78 percent experienced an availability breach while 86 
percent experienced an integrity breach.  In comparison, only 28 percent received a 
confidentiality breach.   The cyber incidents occurred based on the subject’s performance 
to progress through the datasheets within the 30 minutes for each session.  The cyber 
incidents occurred two minutes after sheets 5, 9, and 13 were entered (see Figure 10).   If 
subjects did not progress through the specific number of datasheets, the cyber incident 
did not occur.  
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A final limitation of this study was that only one facilitator was available during 
the actual experiment.  Because subjects were being evaluated on their response times to 
recognize and take proper contingency actions following a cyber incident, a telephone 
was used to report discrepancies.  Hence, subjects had an option of placing a call to six 
different extension numbers.  However, the same facilitator was the receiver of the call at 
every extension number in the same room.  This was noted as a limitation because it 
made the experiment seem unrealistic to the subjects.   
5.4 Contributions to Research 
The data collected has determined the efficacy of having a DSS in place to 
monitor the status of critical ICT.  The results of this research confirm positive empirical 
results, one future outcome would be to replace the manual effort required to coordinate 
with system owners and custodians to determine which organizations are potentially 
affected by a cyber incident.  As a result, this research effort can be operationalized by 
infusing a reliable CIMIA incident notification process into the workplace, where deemed 
appropriate, improving the push method utilized by the USAF.  By doing so, 
organizations would benefit from real-time notification following a cyber incident. 
5.5 Future Research Recommendations 
 One important direction for research is to conduct more experiments that examine 
actual SA.  This will enable direct evaluation of the effects of the proposed concepts of 
CIMIA to enhance SA.  According to Endsley, without a more direct evaluation it will be 
impossible to tell if a proposed concept actually helps SA or inadvertently compromises 
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it in some way.  The Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique is one technique 
that has demonstrated reliability as a measure of SA in empirical investigation (Endsley, 
1995).  It is used to capture an operator’s SA as an objective means by which to quantify 
SA.  The subjective measures of SA or indirect measures of SA used in this study are not 
true presentations of actual SA.   
 A second direction is to more closely examine the nature of the tasks used.  There 
needs to be more research on the results of not receiving or responding to an incident 
notification to determine mission impact estimation.  This will allow further investigation 
into the concepts of CIMIA in that the length of time required for mission personnel to 
recognize and take proper contingency action in response to cyber incidents is time 
sensitive to reduce mission impact.   
 Because the subjects in this study were novices and did not have operational 
backgrounds, one could argue that the CIMIA incident notification process adapted the 
subjects to a sense of urgency to take a contingency action.  Subjects could have 
responded by chance resulting in a lower level of SA, not correctly perceiving pieces of 
information in the situation.  Further research is needed on the CIMIA incident 
notification process by personnel in a specific domain to evaluate the development of 
higher levels of cyber SA.  
 A final recommendation for future research is a more robust experimental design.  
The experimental design selected in this study examined the mean of within-subjects 
responses to the two incident notification processes.  A fundamental disadvantage of 
within-subjects designs is carryover effects.  Increased performance was observed in the 
second session of the experiment for subject that received the pop-up initially.   
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Therefore, further research is needed with a between-subject design to eliminate the 
possibility of carryover effects.  
5.6 Conclusion  
The AF has recognized that it must defend cyberspace from increasing threats and 
attacks against critical information and communication technologies (ICT) aimed at the 
manipulation or destruction of information.  The Air Force has taken several steps to 
mitigate these threats and dominate operations in the cyberspace domain by developing 
cyberspace forces and capabilities to organize, train and equip a full range of defensive 
operations.  Cyberspace combat and support forces have been consolidated under the 
24th Air Force component of the Air Force Space Command to protect the information 
realm which is a central component of the way decision makers fight wars.  However, 
today cyberspace is experiencing a time of increasing threats to information caused by 
inadequate cyber security.  One major problem is decision makers may or may not be 
notified when a cyber incident occurs and not understand the relevance of received 
notifications to maintain situation awareness of potential and actual impact to their 
mission.  As a result, ICT are at risk of a cyber attack that compromise confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability (CIA) of embedded information.   These types of threats against 
the information used by decision makers for day-to-day operations can have real mission 
impact consequences that range from severe degradation to mission failure.   This threat 
is steadily increasing as adversaries operate in cyberspace.  They would like nothing 
more than to gain access to critical ICT that decision makers depend on for mission 
accomplishment.  Having this dependence requires that decision makers have adequate 
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status of the critical ICT entrusted to maintain mission objectives.  Specifically, 
preemptive actions are required for decision makers to effectively secure the information 
assets they depend on and ensure information dominance.   
 Maintaining information dominance, the ability to collect, control, exploit and 
defend while denying an adversary the ability to do the same, must be the focus of 
decision maker’s to deny an adversary cyberspace sanctuary.  Dominance of information 
operations is an important strategic characteristic of cyberspace.  Thus, it is important to 
utilize technologies to reduce threats and attacks on critical information assets, and to 
help allow for decision makers to maintain SA. 
 The results of this research challenges decision makers to take a closer look their 
information dependencies and exploit automation to maintain cyber SA.  A paradigm 
shift is required to have a true appreciation for potential mission impacts following a 
cyber incident.   Asset identification must be achieved through some type of risk 
assessment which explicitly documents and identifies information assets, information 
valuation, and mission-to-information dependencies.  Therefore, the use of a 
methodology such CIMIA can be implemented improve the timely notification of 
downstream information consumers following a cyber incident.   
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